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Abstract: The current health legislation recognizes minors’ capacity 
to make decisions or, at least, to take part in those that affect them, ac-
cording to their age and maturity. But this capacity is not promoted. 
Capacitating minors to make their own decisions is still a challenge, because 
it requires something that today is not happening: autonomy has to be 
understood not as a state, but as a process that needs support. Our pro-
posal is that this support should be based on recognizing minors as vulner-
able persons, that is to say, as persons with emotional needs, who are the 
subjects of rights and duties, and who have social needs of self-fulfillment. 
All in all, autonomy has to be understood as a process based on recogniz-
ing minors’ dignity as a previous condition to help them acquire those 
typical capabilities of autonomous persons. This concept of support re-
quires, in the first place, a change of the social view of minors. 
Keywords: autonomy, minor patient, recognition, capabilities, em-
powerment, pedagogy.
1
PATIENTS’ DIRECT ACCESS TO 
THEIR ELECTRONIC MEDICAL 
RECORD USING THE INTERNET: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Marie C. Leroy a & Michel Dupuis b
Abstract: Patient-accessible medical record is an important element of evolution in the 
patient-physician relationship: patients want to become more active in their health care pro-
cess. We want to highlight the results of studies that analyse the impact of patients having 
access to their electronic medical record using the Internet on patients, on physicians and on 
their relationship. The studies were identified using “Pub Med” and “Web of Knowledge”. 
The search was limited to articles published between 2000 and October 2012. We focused 
on articles about patients accessing, through Internet, their electronic medical record that are 
created and filled in by physicians. 26 studies were selected and analysed. Quantitative data 
were obtained through questionnaires, analysis of the log-ins and analysis of the records, while 
qualitative data were obtained through interviews and focus groups. The specificity of our 
review refers to the electronic means through which patients access their electronic medical 
(and particularly Internet).
Keywords: Electronic medical record, Patients access, Internet, physician-patient rela-
tionship, health knowledge, communication, autonomy.
INTRODUCTION
Patient-accessible medical record is part of a wider movement of changes in the patient-
physician relationship. Nowadays, patients want to become more active in their healthcare 
process: they want to be informed about their health status and participate in the decision-
making process. The electronic medical record (EMR) is now widely used and Internet allows 
patients to access it when and how they want. 
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INTRODUCTION
Respect for patient’s autonomy has become a fundamental bioeth-
ics principle, which has brought about legislative and paradigm 
changes. However, the previous pedagogy needed to develop yhat 
principle has not been implemented yet. A pedagogical process of 
autonomy forging that begins with the assistance relationship with 
children and adolescents is necessary in order to have autonomous 
adults. Furthermore, this process requires something that goes beyond 
the pediatrician surgery. The social view of minors has to change in 
all areas: family, school and society as a whole. 
Thus, our proposal of minors’ capacitation needs two questions to 
be answered: In which sense does the traditional view of minors have 
to change in order to promote autonomy? And, from this view, how 
can minors’ autonomy be encouraged in the health care field?
THE FRACTUOUS VIEW OF MINORS 
The western culture has traditionally assumed that minors are not 
autonomous, because they are neither moral agents nor subjects of rights. 
This culture states that the faculty of making moral judgments is linked 
to reason and that children do not have the same capability of moral 
reasoning than adults. In other words, minors are not mature. Let’s have 
a historical overview of the social conception of minors.
In prehistory the elderly are beloved because they are the tradition’s 
bounders and transmitters and thus they become the cohesive force of 
the family life. In this context, minors are thought to have the opposite 
characteristics as those attributed to elderly: impotence, ignorance, rash-
ness.
The first great attitude change takes places in Greece (De los Reyes 
Lopez, M., Sánchez Jacob, M. (Eds.)., 2010).1 The Greek culture is 
naturalistic: moral is identified with natural. It is considered that nature 
achieves physical and moral perfection in maturity, which is the stage 
in which certain virtues are acquired. In Greece both children and el-
derly are flawed, because they are in an intermediate state between 
health and illness. The old are flawed to excess, because they are de-
1 Ch. 4 and introductions of Ch. 5, 40. 
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crepit and minors are so by default, because they are immature. They 
are not subjects, but objects. They are their parent’s possessions. That 
is why minors are seen as physically and morally flawed, apart from 
incomplete, defective and thus in some way ill (in-fermus),2 frail, unable 
to look after themselves. The childhood is a period that has to be over-
come as soon as possible and in the best possible way. 
With Rousseau and the Romanticism culminates the second great 
attitude change. Now the paradigm of perfection is the child-adoles-
cent. Rousseau claims (1970 and 1985) that children are the only 
healthy ones and that humanity is to be found in childhood and ado-
lescence: the child is naturally good (acts rightly). Evil and unfairness 
arise in social relationships. That change of conception is put down 
to minors’ school enrollment, which makes children to be non-
anonymous and the center of the family life. They are beloved by 
their families and do not have an inferior status anymore. Childhood 
is just one stage in human life and probably better than the others in 
terms of happiness. 
Nowadays the earlier stages of the human being’s life are the most 
beloved ones. Childhood is considered to be the personality blooming 
period and the one of identity reassertion. Values and attitudes, and 
thus a lifestyle and a vital project, are built up over it. During second 
half of the twentieth century, the absolute and paternalistic protection 
of minors is mitigated and the ownership of some of their rights is 
recognized. Laws that give and grant rights to minors are passed. One 
example is the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (UN, 1959). 
However, this situation leaves a lot to be desired. Although the 
rights’ ownership of minors is recognized, there are some areas in 
which their capacity to exercise them is still not recognized, because 
neither is their maturity, beyond exceptional cases3. In general terms 
there is a fractuous view of minors: professionals that have to respond 
to minors’ needs often reduce them to the dimension each one takes 
care of. Teachers reduce minors to minds that have to be completed 
2 In Spanish the word ‘ill’ is translated as ‘enfermo’, which comes from ‘in-fermus’, 
meaning not solid. 
3 It happens in the health care area, in which minors from 12 years old can be 
‘mature minors’, that is to say, they can make their own decisions regarding their 
health, but this possibility is exceptional: minors are immature as long as the physicist 
does not prove the contrary. 
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with knowledge; politicians consider them to be citizens that have to 
respect the rules of social coexistence; the media consider them con-
sumers…. 
But the person cannot be reduced to just one of its dimensions. Eric 
Cassell states that the person is a joint of “me” (me as a child, as a pupil, 
as a son…), so everything we do implies the person as a whole. He defines 
it as “a human, bodily, thinking, reflective, sensitive, emotional and re-
lational individual” (Cassell, 2009:15-16). Mounier (1976:59) defines it 
as “a spiritual being, which is composed of a form of subsistence and 
independence that is maintained by joining a values hierarchy, freely 
lived and responsibly assimilated and in a constant correction. All uni-
fied in a free and creative activity.” 
Therefore a comprehensive view of minors is needed for integrat-
ing all dimensions in an autonomous subject with a vital project, as a 
biopsychosocial and spiritual being. Obviously, minors do not have 
all dimensions as developed as adults, they still do not have its vital 
project forged, because they are neither fully nor always autonomous. 
Minors are thus a biopsychosocial and spiritual being, but vulnerable. 
Professionals that take care of minors’ needs have to support them in 
their autonomy development process, each one from his area, but 
without losing perspective: the ultimate goal has to be to help them 
to develop their autonomy as a complete, biopsychosocial and spiri-
tual person. 
CLARIFYING CONCEPTS 
This comprehensive view implies that supporting minors’ auton-
omy development process means to satisfy their expectations of rec-
ognition, which is the opportunity they need to develop the capa-
bilities required to be autonomous. The idea of recognition is explained 
by Axel Honneth and the capabilities are proposed by Martha C. 
Nussbaum. Before going deeply into it, though, some concepts need 
to be clarified. 
The first one is ‘minor’. Minors are people under 18, or under 16 in 
health care. Anyway, the age-group between 0 and 10 years is called 
childhood and at 12 years adolescence begins. The age-group between 10 
and 12 years can be childhood or adolescence depending on the child’s 
maturity. 
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The second concept to be defined is ‘health’. Jordi Gol Gorina4 defines 
it as the personal, caring and joyful autonomy. The WHO defines it as 
the state of full physical, psychical and social wellbeing. Both definitions 
may seem presumptuous and difficult to put into effect, although they 
stress an important idea: there is not a clear delimitation between health 
and illness, but there are degrees of health that one loses and wants to 
regain. Therefore, a healthy growth is not one without illness, but one 
based on an appropriate dealing with health conditions, which makes 
prevention to be extremely necessary. 
The third concept is ‘autonomy’. It has two dimensions: moral and 
functional. The moral autonomy is the capability to make decisions ac-
cording to one’s own set of values and personal goals (Beauchamp and 
Childress,1979). The functional autonomy is the possession of basic 
abilities to be self-sufficient in the daily-life activities. Although both di-
mensions are significant for minors’ growth, we will focus on the moral 
one and it will be understood as synonym of maturity. 
It has to be said that autonomy is not opposed to ‘vulnerability’. Sev-
eral authors (Honneth, 2009; Buttiglione, 1999; among others) claim 
that the human being is vulnerable by definition, because he is dependent 
on his relationships with others. Thus vulnerability (as dependency) is 
not a weakness, but a condition of the possibility to acquire autonomy. 
That is why support is so important. 
Without avoiding the complexity of defining ‘dignity’, we will stay 
confined to the intuitive idea of the inner value that every person deserves 
just because of being a person. Dignity, on the contrary of autonomy, 
has no degree: either one has it or not. Autonomy can be partially or 
totally lost, but dignity remains. 
The last concept that needs defining is ‘justice’. It will be understood 
as equal opportunities in order to develop capabilities. Consequently, 
injustice is the infringement of equal opportunities. 
SUPPORT AS VULNERABILITY RECOGNITION 
Recognition (Honneth, 2009; and Costa-Alcaraz, 2012) is mutual 
respect based on the equal dignity of all human beings. That is why the 
struggle for recognition begins when expectations of recognition are in-
4 X Congress of Catalan Physicists and Biologists (Perpignan, 1976). 
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jured. Injuring them is a moral crime that generates feelings of injustice, 
whereas satisfying them helps to transform conflictive relationships into 
cooperative ones. 
Honneth proposes three recognition spheres. The first one is love, 
which is defined as having lived within a family and having been ac-
cepted as one is. That makes interpersonal relationships easier. Injuring 
the expectation of emotional recognition means a physical humiliation, 
which makes self-confidence decrease. The second sphere is law and is 
defined as becoming a subject of rights and duties and thus in having a 
shared identity as a member of society. Injuring the expectation of legal 
recognition means a limitation of individual rights, which makes self-re-
spect (moral responsibility) decrease. The third sphere is solidarity, which 
is defined as respecting the positive contributions. Injuring the expectation 
of social recognition means a degradation of self-fulfilling possibilities, 
which makes self-esteem decrease. 
The ultimate goal of recognition is the personal identity forging, as 
long as others help to it: the recognition by others allows self-recognition, 
which makes to have the conviction of the own moral and social value. 
The acquisition of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem helps person 
to forge a vital project in which he/she conceives herself as autonomous 
and individualized5. 
Let’s extrapolate this approach to minors. Minors are a social group 
that cannot become a lobby, because they meet none of its three require-
ments: they are aware neitherof their own vulnerability, nor of the 
power of the fight and thus they do not fight. The others (family, teach-
ers, physicians, society as a whole) are the ones that have to fight on their 
behalf.
That is why recognition cannot be reciprocal, but adults have to 
recognize that minors are more dependent on others than them, that 
is, more vulnerable. So the recognition is based on equal dignity of 
minors with regard to adults. Minors’ dignity has to be recognized as 
a previous step to permit (and support) their autonomy to develop. 
Traditionally minors were not considered to be autonomous, because 
they were not considered to be mature. Now it appears that they were 
not considered to be mature because their dignity was not recognized. 
And the way to recognize it is by fighting on their behalf, by not injur-
5 Other authors have similar thoughts to those of Honneth, i.e., Ricoeur (1966) 
or Lévinas (2000). 
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ing their expectations of recognition6 in order to establish a cooperative 
relationship with them.7 
Regarding the three spheres of recognition, the emotional one is the 
recognition from parents, as long as they are the minors’ first and most 
significant moral standards. That makes them to be self-confident and 
also their relationships with others (teachers, physicians, other adults or 
other minors, who can also become moral standards) are facilitated. 
The legal recognition is the recognition of minors’ ownership of rights 
and –according to their cognitive development– their capacity to exercise 
them. But minors have to be also recognized as subjects of duties. 
Social recognition is the respect for the degree of autonomy that minors 
have in each situation. That respect can be shown by helping them to 
choose their moral values and to forge their vital project (or questioning 
inappropriate behaviors with assertiveness) and also by having them 
participate in the decision-making process, letting them assume responsi-
bilities according to their age and cognitive development. 
Lastly, recognition helps minors to forge their identity in a more de-
cisive way than in adults, because they are just beginning to define both 
it and their vital project, and the beginning can determine the process and 
the end. The fact of having their moral and social value recognized or not 
and thus that they believe it or not, will determine their personality to a 
large extent and, ultimately, whether they will tend to recognize others 
or not. The three spheres of recognition, therefore, will make minors to 
conceive themselves as immersed in the forge of their vital project, that 
is, in the process of developing their autonomy and forging their own 
individuality. 
SUPPORT AS CREATION OF CAPABILITIES 
Recognition is the opportunity that minors need to develop those 
capabilities needed to be autonomous. According to Martha C. Nussbaum 
6 Expectations can be created and directed, minors do not have them by themselves. 
That is why, when exaggerated, expectations can be injured (educated). But here we 
are talking about expectations of recognition.
7 Relationships are a very important quality of life’s constituent, which has three 
dimensions: objective (real), subjective (perceived) and social (relational). If minors’ 
relationships are conflictive, unhealthy or null, their global quality of life will be very 
deficient, no matter how good are the objective and subjective ones. 
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(Nussbaum, 2007 and Gough 2007/08) a fair society has to be based on 
equal opportunities in order to develop capabilities. Capabilities are what 
people are capable to do and to be, depending on an intuitive idea of what 
a life in accordance with human dignity is. However, Amartya Sen (Dréze 
I Sen, 1997)8 states that everybody has different needs and different 
abilities to transform their capabilities into results, that is, into a dignified 
life. Therefore, equal opportunities means equal possession of all basic 
capabilities from an appropriate minimum threshold and up to the 
maximum possible, for each person and each capability. Below that 
threshold a dignified life is not possible. The idea is to make a list of ca-
pabilities and ask what would be the minimum capability compatible with 
human dignity for each area of activity of a typical human life. All in all, 
it means asking what each person is capable to do and what is not, and 
help him/her to acquire those capabilities that he/she lacks. 
Nussbaum’s list contains ten capabilities, but she says it is only a ten-
tative and reviewable proposal. They are: life; bodily health; bodily in-
tegrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; af-
filiation; other species; play; and control over the environment. Practical 
reason and affiliation are the main ones. But, according to Nussbaum, 
health assistance (in a comprehensive meaning) is a basic citizens’ need. 
It is not one more capability, but the basis of the whole capabilities spec-
trum. In the health care field, because of patient’s dependency (especially 
the minor patients), the main capabilities are life, bodily health and bod-
ily integrity. 
Similarly as in Honneth’s theory of recognition, Nussbaum’s capa-
bilities approach is based on the defense of individuality, which wants to 
overcome –among others– the traditional view of minors as no-faced 
individuals, that is, individuals without a significant identity. The children’s 
right to achieve the minimum threshold of capabilities in order to have 
a dignified life is due yo often hampered (due to lack of recognition, be 
for overprotection).9 
8 Amartya Sen does not agree with Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, but both phi-
losophers are the first ones to deal with quality of life and also both deal with oppor-
tunities and liberties. 
9 Appelbaum and Grisso propose four capacities that specify the Nussbaum’s 
‘practical reason’ and ‘senses, imagination and thought’: understanding of relevant 
information, appraisal of the situation, manipulation of information and capability to 
communicate a maintained choice in time. Piaget and Kohlberg, despite of being 
branded as excessively Kantian and harshly criticized by Carol Gilligan, also specifies 
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MEDICAL CONSULTATION AS A SPHERE OF EMPOWERMENT 
In the health care area the fractuous view of minors becomes a bio-
centric view. Physicians reduce people with health conditions to their 
biological dimension and understand them as broken bodies that need 
repair. Traditionally this view has meant that ill people were not consid-
ered to be members of society. Nowadays that does not happen anymore 
because bioethics –and specifically the bioethics principle named ‘re-
spected for persons’– has returned the condition of persons to ill people. 
However, the biocentric view of patients still remains and consequently 
the relationship between patients and physicians is often merely inform-
ative (Emmanuel & Emmanuel, 2010). Furthermore, it can be said 
(Engel, 1977) that health care has become an industry, because the plan-
ning and the funding of health care services depend on the technologies 
available and as a result everything does: diagnosis is based on tests that 
are carried out by machines or in labs... All in all, nowadays an evidence-
based medicine is being imposed. It has to be overcome in favor of a 
comprehensive view of illness as a situation with psychosocial determi-
nants, that is, in favor of a comprehensive view that conceives patients as 
biopsychosocial, spiritual and vulnerable persons, and minor patients as 
biopsychosocial, spiritual and doubly vulnerable persons. 
In order to change the view of illness, its experience has to be under-
stood. Illness is experienced as a threat (Laín Entralgo, 1984: 316; Chap-
man and Gravin, 1993; Bayés, 2001:47-68). The threat generates suffer-
ing and alters the person’s time, because it interrupts his/her vital project. 
Suffering is wider than pain, which is only one of its causes, and the 
person suffering is subjected to time instead of having it at his/her dis-
posal. So, the physician has to synchronize his professional subjective 
time (present, accelerated time) with the patient’s subjective experiential 
time (future, slow time of diagnosis and prognosis). In minors this expe-
rience is more serious, because they are not used to face adversity (neither 
have they enough resources to do so), they want immediate solutions to 
the ‘practical reason’ in those capabilities of an autonomous moral, which could be 
five: critical thought to weight up alternatives, reflection on one’s own moral values, 
appropriate management and use of resources, empathy, and information management. 
Apart from capabilities, autonomy also requires attending to the decision’s seriousness 
(Drane’s scale shows that the more serious a decision is, the more capacity is needed 
to make it) and to the environment (familiar, cultural,...). (DE LOS REYES, M., 
SÁNCHEZ JACOB, M. (eds). (2010) pp., 40-47, 361-364, 368-369).
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problems and they exaggerate the frustration of not having their expecta-
tions satisfied. In any case, the vital project is interrupted, because the 
person’s world becomes disordered and lose sense. The person is discon-
nected from his/her world and loses the sensation of indestructibility. 
That is why it becomes necessary to have a relationship of confidence 
with the physician, in which context he helps patients not to lose moral 
autonomy, by trying to make their decisions coherent with their moral 
values and vital project. Minors are still forging their vital project and 
developing their autonomy, so the effects of an illness are even more 
devastating and they will need more than ever a relationship of confidence 
with caregivers,10 so that they together with the parents help them to 
define their moral values and the kind of vital project they want to forge. 
Now, in this context, how should recognition of minors be under-
stood? First of all, caregivers have to recognize them as doubly vulnerable 
(because of being minor and ill). Recognizing minors as having equal 
dignity as adults means recognizing that similarly as what happens with 
adult patients, minor patients are still persons, no matter what the effects 
of the illness are. That is why the forge of a cooperative relationship with 
physicians that allows the supported decision-making11 needed. 
There are also three spheres of recognition in health care. Emotional 
recognition is obtained in the relationship between minors and physicians, 
which has to be based on confidence. Physicians have to rely upon minors 
by recognizing them as valid speakers, which will make them rely upon 
physicians and facilitate their relationship with other caregivers. Legal 
recognition means enacting rights and duties for minor patients, as it 
happens for adults. And social recognition means respecting each minor’s 
degree of autonomy, by listening to and educating their opinions, but 
also assertively questioning inappropriate attitudes and behaviors. Simi-
larly, it means making them part of the decision-making process, by 
letting them assume responsibilities in accordance with their age and 
cognitive development. 
Caregivers, ultimately, help to forge minor patients’ identity, because 
they empower them in being responsible for their health (in terms of 
both healing and prevention) and in using health care resources appro-
10 Caregivers are any professionals from the health care system that may treat a 
minor during his life (family doctor, specialists, nurses, psychologists, social workers…). 
11 ‘Supported’ seems more appropriate than ‘shared’, because decisions are indi-
vidual. What is shared is the previous deliberation. 
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priately. Here the vital project is specified in a lifestyle: caregivers help 
minors to develop their autonomy, by helping them to forge a healthy 
lifestyle. 
From this idea of recognition, how are capabilities needed for auton-
omy translated? Nussbaum’s list can be applied to the health care field: 
life (quality of medical attention); bodily health (personal hygiene); bod-
ily integrity (intimacy); senses, imagination and thought (creativity in 
solving attainable medical problems, such as remembering the time to 
take medicines); emotions (capacity to show fear or doubts about the 
illness); practical reason (reasoning on consequences of attainable medical 
decisions, such as whether or not a medicine has to be taken despite of 
disliking its savor); affiliation (affective ties with the physician of reference 
and the caring team); other species (therapeutic effects of having pets or 
taking care of pets as an exercise of responsibility assumption); play (pro-
motion of playing among minors admitted to hospital); and control over 
the environment (familiarity with the medical establishment, the surgical 
instruments…). 
At this point, how can recognition be settled in the medical consulta-
tion in order to allow capabilities to develop? The answer is by making 
the medical consultation12 be a sphere of empowerment with several 
characteristics (Catalonia Bioethics Committee, 2009) that can be classi-
fied in four steps. The first one is familiarization with the environment 
and basic procedures (national health clinic, caregivers, set of instruments 
and procedure to make appointments). 
The second and most important step is to create a sphere of recognition, 
which should have several characteristics: it should be based on mutual 
confidence; the caregiver has to avoid both paternalism and placing adult 
responsibilities on minors; he/she has to assist minors’ vulnerability not 
as a weakness, but as a chance for their empowerment, which has to be 
achieved through the ethics of care13; he/she has to synchronize his/her 
professional time with the minors’ experiential time; he/she has to listen 
to the minors’ account of their problem; he/she has to assist minors’ needs 
12 The medical consultation does not need to be a physical room neither be lo-
cated in the national health clinic (i.e.: ‘Health and School’ program, in Catalan 
‘programa Salut i Escola’) or it can be a phone call (Samaritans). The medical consul-
tation thus is the circumstance in which a minor addresses a caregiver to share a health 
problem with him (in a comprehensive sense of health). 
13 To know more on this concept read Carol Gilligan (1982), Sheila Benhabib 
(1992) or Francesc Torralba (2002). 
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and detect any lack of family recognition (first sphere); all this leads to a 
supported decision-making process based on an attentive listening; and 
therefore all this needs communication abilities, such as empathy and 
compassion. As to this last point it would be positive to have caregivers 
trained in vulnerability management as there are in diversity management. 
The third step is education for health. Assuming that minors and their 
families’ personal options have to be respected, physicians have to take 
an educative role. This role should have several dimensions: healing, ill-
ness prevention and risk prevention. It should have as well a previous 
condition: an appropriate information, which has to be complete, truth-
ful, continued, adapted to minors’ cognitive development and contrasted 
with their experience. Education includes the knowledge (having infor-
mation), the know how (choosing ethical criteria to act) and the know 
how to be (how to be responsible, how to forge one’s identity and vital 
project). Parents should have an intermediary role, but never an inter-
locutor one (they have to help, but not to substitute minors, who are the 
subject of the health condition). 
The last step is getting unhealthy behaviors back on track. Caregivers 
should wield an assertive authority so that minors do not lose confidence 
with them and at the same time modify those behaviors voluntarily. 
PROMOTING AUTONOMY FROM A NEW VISION OF MINORS
This paper maties a proposal of minors capacitation based on under-
standing autonomy as a process that needs support, which firstly requires 
a change in the social view of minors. This proposal aimed at answering 
two questions: In which sense does the traditional view of minors have 
to change in order to promote autonomy? And, from this view, how can 
minors’ autonomy be encouraged in the health care field? Now both can 
be anwered. 
The social view of minors should be modified in favor of a compre-
hensive one that does not fracture them but conceives them as a whole 
–a vulnerable, developing whole. This new vision has to consider the 
experience of illness as that of a threat, which generates suffering and 
slows down the minors’ time, because it interrupts their vital project and 
thus it makes a relationship of confidence with caregivers necessary. This 
relationship should help minors forge their autonomy, by helping them 
choose their moral values and the kind of vital project they want. All in 
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all, the new vision as to be one that conceives minors as biopsychosocial 
and spiritual, vulnerable, beings. 
This new comprehensive view will allow caregivers to promote minors’ 
autonomy, that is, to support them in the autonomy development process. 
Firstly, caregivers should grant minors the opportunity they need to 
develop basic capabilities. This opportunity is the emotional, legal and 
social recognition of their dignity, which means relying upon them, re-
specting them and loving them, so that they can have self-confidence, 
self-respect and self-esteem. This recognition will transform the medical 
consultation into a sphere of empowerment to help minors develop the 
ten basic capabilities of an autonomous person. In that way minors will 
forge a healthy lifestyle as a significant part of their vital project. 
Obviously, this is a theoretical proposal that needs to be translated  into 
a practical usable tool for caregivers working with children, to allow them 
to transform the informed consent process into a supported elaboration 
of each minor’s health problem. It should be done according to the narra-
tive ethics and the ethics of care. But that would mean another paper. 
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